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PUBLICATION AND PREEMPTION IN COPY-
RIGHT LAW: ELEGIAC REFLECTIONS ON
GOLDSTEIN v. CALIFORNIA
Ralph S. Brown, Jr.*
In Goldstein v. California' the Supreme Court was asked to
help eliminate unauthorized tapes, a parasite on the recording in-
dustry.2 This Article is a critical account of how, in search of a
remedy, the Court rediscovered state copyright and rode rough-
shod over the concept of publication in copyright law.
The "tape pirate" takes and sells two separable sets of inter-
ests. One is the rights in the musical composition. These are
usually embraced by the compulsory licensing scheme that has
* Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
I don't know whether Professor Mueller will join in these strictures on
Goldstein v. California. For one thing, the decision paid great deference to the
interests of the Golden State, where Peggy and Ad put down refreshing roots
nearly two decades ago, in the early days of the UCLA Law School, when a
valiant little band outfought and outlasted an obscurantist administration. They
had already pulled up the New Haven roots, to the lasting regret of their Yale
friends. Of course, the real roots are in Wisconsin, in the stubborn, sturdy soil
of Milwaukee. When I was housed in a University of Wisconsin high-rise at a
meeting there a year ago, I was delighted to discover and show to Professor
Nimmer a modest bronze plaque, saying simply "A. Mueller." It was in an
elevator. An inquiring note to Ad, "Was this a memorial elevator?," led only
to the expected quizzical-shall I say Socratic?-putoff. The incident leads me
to propound a schoolboy riddle, which any schoolboy who has been through
UCLA Law School can answer: Why is Professor Mueller not like an elevator?
Because, though an elevator lifts you up, it also lets you down.
1 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
2 The problem is not new. See Note, Piracy on Records, 5 STAN. L. REV.
433 (1953). However, its magnitude increased enormously because of the facility
with which tapes can be reproduced. See, Hearings on S. 646 and H.R. 6927
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 7 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. For an especially well-in-
formed Note which explores odd corners of unauthorized duplication (e.g., of
operatic performances), refer to Note, Record Piracy and Copyright: Present
Inadequacies and Future Overkill, 23 MAINE L. REV. 359 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Record Piracy]. The big money of course is in current hits. See Lees,
Psst! Get Your Hot Glen Campbell Tapes Here, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1974, § 2,
at 21, col. 1.
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been part of the federal statute since 1909.3 The composer and
publisher may have enforcement problems, but they have clear
enough rights against the pirate.4 The second set of interests is
the rights in the performance or rendition. The sharing of these
interests between the actual artists and the producers of sound
recordings is in dispute; however our present concern is with the
existence and extent of such interests.
Congress in 1971 for the first time created federal rights
against unauthorized duplication of sound recordings.5 But the
operation of these rights was prospective only. The state law
violation alleged in Goldstein preceded the enactment of the fed-
eral statute, so the issue in that case was the enforceability of a
state statute6 against duplications occurring before the 1971
Sound Recording Amendment (hereinafter 1971 amendments) to
the Copyright Act of 1909 became effective. Did the copyright
clause of the Constitution, or the 1909 statute, or the 1971
amendments, or some combination of them, preclude state protec-
tion of sound recordings against unauthorized duplication?
The California statute, copied from a New York prototype,7
is simple and sweeping: One is guilty of a misdemeanor who
knowingly and with intent to sell "transfers or causes to be trans-
ferred any sounds recorded on a phonograph record, disc, wire,
3 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
4 Id. § l(e), 101(e). Note also 17 U.S.C. § 101(e) (Supp. II,
1972), which incorporates the remedies provided for copyright owners gen-
erally. See B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COM-
PETITION, AND OTHER Topics BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL,
AND ARTISTIC WORKS 542 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as KAPLAN & BROWN].
There are also several recent holdings that unauthorized duplication is not the
"similar use" that authorizes a compulsory license under section l(e). Fame
Publishing Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1975);
Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392 (3d
Cir. 1974); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetic, Inc., 497 F.2d
285 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 801 (1975); Duchess Music Corp. v.
Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972). There have
been dissents in each of these cases. Previously, duplicators who paid the statu-
tory royalty stood apart from those who did not. See, Hearings, supra note 2,
at 68-69. Now publishers can seek injunctions against any duplicators.
5 Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, 17 U.S.C. § l(f), 5(n), 19,
20, 26, 101(e) (Supp. II, 1972), amending Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. H9 1
et seq. (1970). The 1971 amendments limited the newly created right to sound
recordings "fixed, published, and copyrighted . . . before January 1, 1975."
Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 392.
This time limitation was removed by a subsequent amendment. Act of Dec.
31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 101, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6854 (Jan.
30, 1975). The subsequent law also increased the criminal penalties for in-
fringing sound recordings. 17 U.S.C.A. § 104 (Supp., Feb. 1975); 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2318 (Supp., Feb. 1975). See H.R. REP. Nos. 1389, 1581, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974) (especially the dissenting views of Congressperson Drinan).
6 CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h(a)(1) (West 1970).
7 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. § 561 (McKinney 1968).
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tape, film," etc., "without the consent of the owner."8  The
"owner" is defined as "the person who owns the master phono-
graph record" or master tape used for producing records or tapes
from which the illicit recorded sounds are in turn derived.9 The
"transfer" of sounds for sale without the consent of the owner of
the master source is the total offense and the total scheme.
Contrast the state laws with the 1971 amendments to the
Copyright Act. They first specify a new exclusive right: to "re-
produce and distribute to the public . . . . the actual sounds fixed
in the recording." 10 Two provisos are incorporated to insure
that this is all that is conferred, and that anyone is free inde-
pendently to make a recording even though its "sounds imitate
or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording . . .,,"
Then, after adding "sound recordings" to the classification of
copyrightable works, the amendments provide for a new form of
notice, the letter P (for "phonogram") in a circle.' 2 This is to
distinguish the new claim of copyright from the copyright in the
recorded composition (if there is one), the notice for which would
be the familiar C in a circle. Definitions and cross-references fol-
low; these locate the new right firmly within the fabric of the stat-
ute. Who would claim and enforce the new copyright was left
ambiguous; there is a reference to "the producer of the sound re-
cording," and that is doubtless the intended solution."3
In order to give the Copyright Office time to prepare for the
new registrations, the statute's effective date was set at four
months after enactment, and accordingly became February 15,
1972. The new right applies only to "sound recordings fixed,
published, and copyrighted on and after the effective date."
Nothing in the Copyright Act as now amended is to "be applied
retroactively or be construed as affecting in any way any rights
with respect to sound recordings fixed before the effective date
of [the] Act."' 4  We shall in due course ask what inferences, if
any, are to be drawn from this disclaimer.
The right against duplication (often called dubbing) is thus
defined; and it acquires scope, duration, and remedies from the
8 CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h(a)(1) (West 1970).
9 Id. § 653h(b).
10 Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, 17 U.S.C. § 1(f) (Supp. II, 1972).
11 Id.
12 Id. § 19.
1s On the administration of the sound recordings copyright, refer to
Keziah, Registration Problems Encountered by the Copyright Office Under the
Recent Sound Recording Amendment, 20 BULL. CoPYR. Soc'Y 3 (1972).
14 Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat.
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HeinOnline -- 22 UCLA L. Rev. 1024 1974-1975
ADDISON MUELLER FESTSCHRIFT
rest of Title 17 of the United States Code. There can be no
realistic doubt that this field---of recordings fixed since February
15, 1972-is now occupied.
The Court, however, had reached for a case where both the
recorded performance that was duplicated and the act of duplicat-
ing antedated February 15, 1972.15 But the effect of its decision
is not confined to this combination of preceding events. In the
Court's reading of the closing disclaimer in the 1971 amendments,
the whole world of recordings created before the effective date
lies open, either ripe for copying or subject to whatever restraints
the states are permitted to impose.
The defendant Goldstein and his co-workers had moved to
dismiss a charge against them for violation of the California stat-
ute, contending that the statute encroached upon a field occupied
both by the federal statutes and by the unaided force of the con-
stitutional grant to Congress of:
Power .. .To promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries .... 16
THE Goldstein OPINION: PREEMPTION
The Chief Justice, in deciding that the copyright clause was
not automatically preemptive, eschewed the easy ground that the
clause by its terms does not exclude concurrent state power. He
took the high road that Marshall first laid out in Gibbons v. Og-
den 7 and that Curtis succinctly stated in Cooley v. Board of War-
dens 8 with respect to the commerce power:
Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national,
or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation,
may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclu-
sive legislation by Congress.' 9
Chief Justice Burger then recalled Madison's observation in No.
43 of the Federalist, about copyright and patent: "The States can-
15 The selection of Goldstein was odd, since the record was skimpy, and
there had been nothing more than one memorandum opinion in the state courts.
See Brief for Petitioners at App., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
Some content was however supplied by Tate Indus. Ass'n of America v. Younger,
316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 401
U.S. 902 (1971) (upholding the California statute in a declaratory judgment
action to which the Goldstein defendants were parties); see Record Piracy,
supra note 2, at 394 n.135.
16 U.S. CONsT. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
17 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
18 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
19 Id.
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not separately make effectual provision for either of the cases
... "20 But he turned away from the conclusion one would ex-
pect, that in an era of national networks and national markets,
"one uniform system" was called for. Instead, he invoked an
image of diversity, asserting that some writings may "be of purely
local importance." He pronounced state copyright capable of "in-
duc[ing] new artistic creations" within a state and minimized the
economic burden of state copyright, likening it to a food conces-
sion which one could avoid by buying elsewhere." Later in the
Court's opinion he noted California's particular interest in barring
piracy as "conduct that may adversely affect the continued produc-
tion of new recordings, a large industry in California. 22
All of this amounts to a quite original endorsement of state
copyright,2 8 which was not even suggested in the numerous briefs
(all but one of the amicus briefs supported California). But this
rehabilitation of state copyright was tempered by a recognition
that Congress can impose as much uniformity as it wishes, and
led to the mild conclusion that "under the Constitution, the States
have not relinquished all power to grant to authors 'the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings.' "4
If the copyright clause does not clearly imply a need for uni-
formity, it is more explicit in specifying that Congress may au-
thorize patents and copyrights only for "limited Times." The in-
tention to limit monopoly grants, especially in products of the
mind, is obvious and has strong historical roots. Is it possible that
the states may create, copyrights of unlimited duration? That
would appear to be what the California statute does; the Court
said it "forbids individuals to appropriate recordings at any time
after release." The Court gave the "limited Times" argument re-
markably short shrift, again with a novel explanation:
When Congress grants an exclusive right or monopoly,
its effects are pervasive; no citizen or State may escape its
reach. As we have noted, however, the exclusive right
granted by a State is confined to its borders. Consequently,
even when the right is unlimited in duration, any tendency to
inhibit further progress in science or the arts is narrowly cir-
cumscribed. The challenged statute cannot be voided for
lack of a durational limitation.25
20 412 U.S. at 555-56, quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (B. Wright
ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
21 412 U.S. at 558-59.
22 Id. at 571.
23 There is, however, a scholarly counterpart to this position. See Whicher,
The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry Into the Constitutional Distribu-
tion of Powers Over the Law of Literary Property in the United States (pt. 1), 9
BULL. COPYR. Soc'Y 102 (1961); id. (pt. 2), at 194 (1962), reprinted in TiHE
CREATIVE ARTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 85 (J. Whicher ed. 1965).
24 412 U.S. at 560.
25 Id. at 560-61.
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The Court, having magnified state copyright power rather
beyond what I believe was the common understanding, then
turned to the decisive question: How far had Congress exerted
its power to displace state law under the supremacy clause? The
opinion was perceptive in observing that:
The history of federal copyright statutes indicates that
the congressional determination to consider specific classes of
writings is dependent, not only on the character of the writ-
ing, but also on the commercial importance of the product to
the national economy. As our technology has expanded the
means available for creative activity and has provided eco-
nomical means for reproducing manifestations of such activity,
new areas of federal protection have been initiated.26
A long footnote recited the accretion of copyrightable classes of
writings since the original Act of 1790, which dealt only with
maps, charts, and books.2 7
The Chief Justice then confidently attacked the problems
posed by the tortuous treatment of player-piano rolls and phono-
graph records in the major revision of the statute in 1909. In
1908 the Supreme Court, in the celebrated and obfuscating case
of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,28 had held
that a player-piano roll could not be an infringing copy of the com-
position (because a copy, the Court said, had to be visually per-
ceptible). The revisers, pressed on the one hand to allow com-
posers some rights against the burgeoning business of making rolls
and records, but on the other intimidated by the implications of
White-Smith v. Apollo (and concerned also not to create exclusive
rights that could be monopolized by a player-piano Trust!),
declared in the authoritative House Report that:
It is not the intention of the committee to extend the
right of copyright to the mechanical reproductions themselves,
but only to give the composer or copyright proprietor the con-
trol, in accordance with the provisions of the bill, of the manu-
facture and use of such devices. 29
The primary provision referred to was section 1(e) which
created a new right in the use of a musical composition on "parts
of instruments" (e.g., rolls and records), modified by the compul-
sory license available to anyone, once the work had been re-
corded. 30
We may readily agree that all this remains obfuscating to this
day, that it determined nothing about the possibility of copyright
28 Id. at 562.
27 Id. at 562 n.17.
28 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
29 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909).
30 17 U.S.C. § I(e) (1970).
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in renditions. Moreover, as the Court concluded (albeit in a
backhanded fashion) in Goldstein: "Nowhere does the report
indicate . . . that Congress intended records, as renderings of
original artistic performance, to be free from state control."'"
Suppose one asks instead whether Congress-in 1909 or
later-intended renderings to be subject to state control? How one
poses the issue reveals one's assumptions. The significance of the
Court's rehabilitation of state copyright is the assumption that it
exists unless Congress takes it away. My starting-point is to doubt
that it exists at all unless Congress says or implies that it wishes
or permits the states to exercise a portion of the copyright power.
In determining how much of a field Congress has pre-
empted, "[n]o simple formula," as the Chief Justice wisely de-
clared, "can capture the complexities of this determination; the
conflicts which may develop between state and federal action are
as varied as the fields to which congressional action may apply."8 "
When there is a fairly comprehensive scheme of federal regulation,
as there is in the Copyright Act, one should look at the total struc-
ture of the Act, as well as at specific sections that speak to its
scope. Of the latter sort, there are three not altogether concor-
dant statements of its scope. One is section 4, a free-floating
declaration: "The works for which copyright may be secured un-
der this title shall include all the writings of an author."83 If this
means that anything which qualifies as a "writing" under the Con-
stitution has been protected by the statute, it is simply not so, even
if all 535 members of Congress should rise in their two Houses
and recite section 4 with feeling. The question before us-the
protection of recorded renditions-makes it clear that the statute
does not protect all "writings." Although there have been doubts
and uncertainties in the past, there has recently been agreement
by the congressional committees reporting the 1971 amendments,
by the Court and the dissenters in Goldstein, and by all right-
thinking copyright scholars and practitioners that: (1) Rendi-
tions are "writings" within the copyright clause; and (2) Rendi-
tions did not become eligible for statutory copyright until Febru-
ary 15, 1972-and then only for the narrowly stated right against
dubbing as distinct, for example, from a right to control the broad-
cast of a rendition.84
Until the 1971 amendments, there simply was no way to fit
renditions within the structure and machinery provided by the
81 412 U.S. at 566 (emphasis in original).
82 Id. at 561.
3 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
84 See note 118 infra.
1028 [Vol. 22: 1022
HeinOnline -- 22 UCLA L. Rev. 1028 1974-1975
ADDISON MUELLER FESTSCHRIFT
statute. The Copyright Office would not accept phonograph rec-
ords for deposit and registration, even for copyright in the musical
composition, and its position was not challenged. 5
The next provision that purports to declare the scope of the
statute is equally puzzling. Section 5, after listing classes (a)
through (m) of works to which copyright is extended, says: "The
above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject matter
of copyright as defined in section 4 of this title . . ... " This
props up section 4, but does not add anything to it. The Chief
Justice concluded reasonably that these sections should not be
given a preemptive reading. But the Court substantially ignored
the third statutory declaration about preemption, section 2. Sec-
tion 2 does have preemptive effect, making "publication" the key
to those parts of copyright that Congress intended to leave to the
states:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit
the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work,
at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publica-
tion, or use of such unpublished work without his consent,
and to obtain damages therefor.87
If the verbiage of section 2 has an archaic aroma-"at common
law or in equity"-it arises because section 2, although new in
1909, is redolent of history. It looks back to the great cases-
Donaldson v. Becket 8 in England, and Wheaton v. Peters89 in this
country-which subjugated whatever copyright existed in the
common law to the early statutes in both countries, and estab-
lished publication as the great divide. After Wheaton v. Peters,
a work that was published could acquire copyright, if at all, only
by adherence to the statute. An unpublished work was left to
common law rights and equitable remedies, that is, to state law.
But it need not have been so. The constitutional grant of power
to Congress refers to "Writings;" it is not limited to published writ-
ings. Thus, from the first Copyright Act of 179040 until 1909 there
was a curious and seldom used federal right of action for the unau-
thorized publication of a manuscript. 41 The 1909 statute deleted
this, but it offered in section 12 a statutory copyright for several
classes of works (but not book manuscripts!) "of which copies are
85 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 568 n.25 (1973); Kurlantzick,
The Constitutionality of State Law Protection of Sound Recordings, 5 CONN. L.
REV. 204, 210 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kurlantzick].
86 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
37 Id. § 2.
8 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).
89 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
40 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 124.
41 Id. § 6, 2 Stat. 125. See Kaplan, Performer's Right and Copyright: The
Capitol Records Case, 69 HARv. L. REV. 409, 424-25 n.59 (1956).
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not reproduced for sale .... (If the reader is beginning to
find the 1909 statute incoherent in important respects, he should
know that he is not alone.) Section 12 is mentioned here only
to underscore the point that Congress can exercise jurisdiction
over unpublished works. The coexistence of section 2 and sec-
tion 12 signals a concurrent and not a preemptive exercise as to
these unpublished works.
The important question is: Does the statute preempt all pub-
lished works? Consider the investitive language of section 10, on
which, I would assert, everything else pivots: "Any person en-
titled thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work by
publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this
title . . . . 4 Does this leave some published works to the state?
If so, which? If publication is the critical event, are renditions
published when they are generally disseminated and sold as sound
recordings? What law decides this, state or federal? These have
been familiar questions in copyright, at least since RCA Manufac-
turing Co. v. Whiteman 4 in 1940. I shall shortly suggest answers
to them.
The immediate point is (remember, we are still working
through the Court's opinion in Goldstein): What did the Court say
about these aspects of publication? Nothing. There is a foot-
note. It is, with all due respect, deplorably ill-informed. Its total
text follows:
Petitioners place great stress on their belief that the
records or tapes which they copied had been "published."
We have no need to determine whether, under state law,
these recordings had been published or what legal conse-
quences such publication might have. For purposes of fed-
eral law, "publication" serves only as a term of the art which
defines the legal relationships which Congress has adopted
under the federal copyright statutes. As to categories of writ-
ings which Congress has not brought within the scope of the
federal statute, the term has no application.45
That footnote is appended to a rather cursory consideration
of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.46 and Compco Corp.
v. Daybrite Lighting Co.,47 which will be discussed presently. It
is as though the opinion were hurrying to a close. And it does
close, in a brief coda which quickly recapitulates earlier themes:
California's power "retained under the Constitution" has been
42 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
43 Id. § 10 (emphasis added).
44 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
45 412 U.S. at 570 n.28 (emphasis by the Court).
46 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
47 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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exercised to give "recordings the attributes of property." No stat-
utory preemption bars the way, "since Congress has indicated
neither that it wishes to protect, nor to free from protection, re-
cordings of musical performance fixed prior to February 15,
1972. '' 48 This conclusion must rest in large part on the disclaimer
in the 1971 amendments, the meaning of which had been left un-
explored. We are reassured that: "No restraint has been placed
on the use of an idea or concept;" others "can record the same
composition in the same manner." Sears and Compco, "which
[the Court said] we reaffirm today" are simply inapplicable.4
Congress can take further action if it chooses.
What we have from the Court, then, is first an unnecessarily
elaborate reconstruction of state power to create copyright inter-
ests, a power that is, however, always vulnerable to preemption.
Second, the copyright clause itself is found wanting in preemptive
force, a conclusion that might be acceptable if it had not dealt
so casually with the "limited Times" constraint.50 Third, what
looks like preemptive language in the statute (sections 4 and 5)
is shown not to have that effect; but, fourth, the significance of
publication (sections 2 and 10) as denoting a primarily federal
sphere for published works is ignored; and, fifth, the teaching of
Sears and Compco, that omission from protection points toward
exposure to competition, is diminished.
PUBLICATION: LEARNED HAND V. NEW YORK
Let us try to construct the fourth and fifth steps that the
Court neglected. The significance of publication is dramatized
by a long wrestling match between Judge Learned Hand and the
New York courts. Judge Hand achieved the first fall, in RCA
Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman.51 There, RCA as producer and
Paul Whiteman as band leader tried to prevent the broadcast of
Whiteman records.5 2  The records bore the restrictive legend
"Only For Non-commercial Use."5" The legend was held to be
ineffective. 54 The plaintiffs asserted the broadcasters' conduct to
48 412 U.S. at 571.
49 Id.
50 Ct. Kurlantzick, supra note 35, at 225.
51 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940). For an
important companion statement of Judge Hand's views on publication, refer to
Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1940).
52 Whiteman had previously sued a broadcasting company to enjoin the
broadcast of records of his performances. In this case RCA was also suing
the same broadcasting company, but joined Whiteman as defendant so as to
establish that he had no interest in the records of his performances. 114 F.2d
at 87.
58 Id.
54 Id. at 88.
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be unfair competition (recall that at the time there were regular
live broadcasts by the big bands), invoking the misappropriation
concept of International News Service v. Associated Press.55
Judge Hand deprecated the authority and applicability of Inter-
national News in a famous passage." The plaintiffs, he insisted,
were claiming a common law copyright, but they no longer had
one because the renditions had been published. 7 This conclu-
sion is entwined with arguments rebutting the efficacy of the re-
strictive notice. That the renditions were published so as to divest
common law copyright is not stated in directly quotable form; but
there was no doubt of the presence and impact of this view. In-
deed in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp.58 Judge
Dimock later characterized RCA Manufacturing Co. v. White-
man as stating that "common law property . . .ended with the
sale of the records and that thereafter anyone might copy them
and use them as he pleased."5 9  (The latter part of this charac-
terization goes a bit too far; Whiteman was not directly concerned
with copying).
Judge Hand's direct opponent in Whiteman was not the New
York courts, but the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which three
years before in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc.,60 had
reached conclusions on the main issues contrary to Hand's posi-
tion. The Whiteman decision did not invoke federal supremacy.
Indeed, in that innocent time when the Erie doctrine was still in
its infancy, Hand did not say what law he was invoking. His own
authority, and that of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals as then
constituted, pinned Waring to the mat to win the first round.
55 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
56 That much discussed decision really held no more than that a
western newspaper might not take advantage of the fact that it was
published some hours later than papers in the east, to copy the news
which the plaintiff had collected at its own expense. In spite of some
general language it must be confined to that situation; certainly it
cannot be used as a cover to prevent competitors from ever appropriat-
ing the results of the industry, skill, and expense of others. "Property"
is a historical concept; one may bestow much labor and ingenuity
which inures only to the public benefit; "ideas", for instance, though
upon them all civilization is built, may never be "owned". The law
does not protect them at all, but only their expression; and how far
that protection shall go is a question of more or less; an author has no
"natural right" even so far, and is not free to make his own terms with
the public. . . . If the talents of conductors of orchestras are denied
that compensation which is necessary to evoke their efforts because
they get too little for phonographic records, we have no means of
knowing it, or any right to assume it; and it is idle to invoke the deus
ex machina of a "progress" which is probably spurious, and would not
be for us to realize, if it were genuine.
114 F.2d at 90 (citation omitted).
57 See, id. at 87.
58 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
59 Id. at 663.
60 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
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But the New York courts were then and are now true be-
lievers in an expansive tort of misappropriation. In the second
round ten years later, Justice. Greenberg called upon this ground
for relief in Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc. v. Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp.61 There the defendants' misconduct lay
in taking Metropolitan broadcasts off the air and selling records
of them. The Met had an exclusive contract with Columbia Rec-
ords, which was also a plaintiff."2 If this case had been decided
on a theory of common law copyright, the court would not have
had to conclude that broadcast performances had been published
so as to divest common law rights. It is well established that an
unrecorded performance does not "publish" a dramatic or a musi-
cal work so as to divest common law rights; such works are tradi-
tionally published by reproduction in printed copies."3 Similarly,
the unrecorded performance by a Saturday afternoon's soloist,
chorus and orchestra need not be considered publication, even if
it is broadcast. The "author"-here taken to be the Metropolitan
Opera Association-should have the right of first publication, of
first reproducing the performance in some form of "copies." In
the case of a rendition, the only form of copy that is imaginable,
certainly the only form that would be salable, is a recording. If
publication has any useful meaning, the rendition has been pub-
lished once it has been generally disseminated in recordings for
sale. Whether the performer then has a right to prevent others
from reproducing his record is of course the question; and, as the
Court held in Goldstein, that is a question of copyright.
But Justice Greenberg did not follow this dusty path in his
opinion. He galloped off cross-country to protect the "property"
of the plaintiffs against the defendants' "unconscionable business
practices and their invasion of the moral standards of the market
place" by a "venture purposed to gather in the harvest the seeds
of which were planted and nurtured by others ... -64 The Ap-
pellate Division affirmed in an unemotional per curiam opinion,
the essence of which was:
Defendants' acts, as alleged in the complaint, constitute
a misappropriation of the work, skill, expenditure and good
will of plaintiffs, and present a case of unfair competition.
Moreover, upon this record, these property interests of plain-
tiffs are entitled to protection by injunction pendente lite
61 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aft'd 279 App. Div.
632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1051).
62 American . Broadcasting. Company, which had an exclusive broadcast
contract with Metropolitan, was also a plaintiff.
63 Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912); qee text accompanying note 88
inf ra.
64 199 Misc. at 805, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
1975] 1033
HeinOnline -- 22 UCLA L. Rev. 1033 1974-1975
UCLA LAW REVIEW
against acts of infringement induced by defendants' unfair
course of business.! 5
Finally in the third round an actual case of sound recording
duplication came before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp.6 6 Plaintiff and
defendant were each in possession of master recordings of virtu-
oso performances of compositions in the public domain. After
finding that "plaintiff was in the beginning vested with the right
to make and vend the records in the United States," Judge Dim-
ock properly inquired: "Was that right lost as soon as plaintiff
sold first records?"67  RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, he
noted, would tell us: "The common-law property in the perform-
ances of musical artists which had been recorded ended with the
sale of the records. .... 8
But, Judge Dimock continued, that statement from the White-
man case, "is not the law of the State of New York."6 " He con-
sidered it an inescapable inference from the Metropolitan Opera
case that New York courts would protect the producer of sound
recordings. Indeed, though not much was made of it, Columbia
had earlier made and sold recordings of two of the Metropolitan
operas that defendants had taken off-the-air. (But note, the
records were not of the same performance that defendants ap-
propriated.)
How did the law of the state of New York come to be con-
trolling? It was much more than a matter of heightened sensi-
tivity to Erie. Judge Dimock, in a careful and persuasive analysis,
showed that renditions were writings capable of copyright but that
they were not protected under the 1909 Act. Without using any
of the apparatus for finding or denying preemption, he then con-
cluded baldly: "Since the Copyright Act does not deal with the
protection of phonograph records of the performances of public-
domain compositions by virtuosos, we have no basis for applying
federal law.""0
This was the weak point of his otherwise admirable opinion,
and Judge Hand lunged for it. But he missed, for his is the dis-
senting opinion. In a passage of considerable density, he main-
tained that whether federal law applied must be a federal ques-
tion. Taking as given that in federal law "publication" amounts
e5 279 App. Div. 632, 633, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795, 797 (1951).
66 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
67 Id. at 663.
68 Id. (Dimock, J.), characterizing the result in RCA Mfg. Co. v. White-
man, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
69 221 F.2d 657, 663 (2d Cir. 1955).
70 Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
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to a surrender of common law property, he said it was arguable
that:
[t]he courts of New York should be deemed free, sub
nomine "unfair competition," to determine what conduct
shall constitute a "publication" of a "work" not covered by
the Copyright Act. It would then follow that they could
grant to an author a perpetual monopoly, although he ex-
ploited the "work" with all the freedom he would have en-joyed, had it been copyrighted. I cannot believe that the
failure of Congress to include within the Act all that the
Clause covers should give the states so wide a power. To do
so would pro tanto defeat the overriding purpose of the
Clause, which was to grant only for "limited Times" the un-
trammelled exploitation of an author's "Writings." Either he
must be content with such circumscribed exploitation as does
not constitute "publication," or he must eventually dedicate
his "work" to the public.71
He reinforced this "limited Times" argument with a demonstra-
tion that the clause also presses for national uniformity.
Judge Hand concluded that it was wrong for Judge Dimock
to rely on "the view of the New York courts." If. a performer's
work is a writing within the copyright clause, Hand said "it must
follow that it is a federal question whether he has published the
'work.' "72 Federal preemption principles and federal copyright
principles require attention to the decisive role of publication.
By now Judge Hand had lost, two falls out of three. Ringer,
an astute commentator, in summing up the state of the law in
1957, could reasonably conclude (after examining all the cases,
not just the high points here reviewed) that "courts in dubbing
[duplicating] cases must apply state common law rules.
Recent decisions indicate that common law dopyright protection
for a recorded performance may be unlimited both in duration and
in scope. '7'  And so also unlimited protection on a theory of un-
fair competition might be available "where there has simply been
a 'misappropriation' or a 'free ride.' ,,71
Thus, Hand's seemed a voice crying in the wilderness. But
it was the voice of a true prophet, for in 1964 his position was
essentially validated in the Sears and Compco cases.'
In these unanimous decisions the Court held broadly that a
state could not prevent copying of lamps and lighting fixtures that
did not qualify for patents, and also broadly declared that the same
71 Id. at 667.
72 id.
73 Ringer, The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings, COPYMGHT
LAw REvisIoN STUDIES, No. 26, in SENATE COMM. ON THE JuDIcuyY, 82D CONO.,
2D S.ss. 20 (Comm. Print 1961; original date 1957).
74 Id.
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federal preemption principles would apply to works not copyright-
able.75 Federal supremacy pervaded Justice Black's opinion,
carrying with it what seemed to be a clear message that federal
law must determine whether an invention or a writing is open to
the public; that is, whether it is published, whether it has the pro-
tection of patent or copyright, and whether the states can give it
any form of protection.
THE PUT-DOWN OF Sears AND Compco
However, this vindication of Hand's position turned to ashes
in Goldstein (we are now in the fifth step of that opinion). For
familiar and generous readings of Sears and Compco, we have to
look to the dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and Marshall.76
They noted that, although these cases were about patents, Justice
Black had reiterated:
Today we have held in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Stiffel
Co.. . . that when an article is unprotected by a patent or a
copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that ar-
ticle. To forbid copying would interfere with the federal
policy, found in Art. I § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in
the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to
copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in
the public domain.77
Justice Douglas pointed to the Court's emphasis in Sears on the
need for "uniform federal standards" in the patent system, and
recalled with approval Judge Hand's similar observations about
copyright. Justice Marshall, mindful that the silence of Congress
is ordinarily said to betoken freedom from preemption, saw in
Sears and Compco:
A rule of construction that, unless the failure to provide
patent or copyright protection for some class of works could
clearly be shown to reflect a judgment that state regulation
was permitted, the silence of Congress would be taken to re-
flect a judgment that free competition should prevail. 78
But the Court read Sears and Compco narrowly.
In those cases, the question was whether a State could, under
principles of a state unfair competition law, preclude the
copying of mechanical configuratiops which did not possess
the qualities required for the granting of a federal design or
mechanical patent. 79
The Chief Justice found in the patent law a careful balance be-
tween articles it was willing to protect in order to "encourage in-
75 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
76 412 U.S. at 572, 576.
77 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
78 412 U.S. at 577-78.
79 id. at 569.
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novation and originality of invention" and those "it wished to re-
main free" to be copied. But, "[i]n regard to this category of
'writings' [sound recordings] Congress has drawn no balance;
rather it has left the area unattended, and no reason exists why
the State should not be free to act."" °
Now, there are seemingly important differences between
patent preemption and copyright preemption which I will note
very briefly. First, the objects in Sears and Compco were un-
patentable because they did not meet the qualitative standards of
invention, not because lamps and lighting fixtures as such were
not patentable machines or patentable designs. The copyright
equivalent to the lamp in Sears would be works that are unoriginal
or that are too abstract to be considered expressions."' It would
confound the copyright system to let the states create monopolies
in such works, just as it would confound the patent system to let
the states give patents for discoveries that are in fact obvious.
Unlike Sears and Compco, Goldstein dealt with categories of
works that are not included in the copyright statute. Similar prob-
lems can arise with patent subject-matter. For example, the Su-
preme Court has held that most computer programs are not statu-
tory subject-matter.8 2  Does this mean that the states can issue
patents on computer programs? I doubt it; in this respect the
patent system is more preemptive than copyright (and always has
been)."'
But even though patent law is preemptive, it does leave a
substantial area to state regulation, namely the protection of con-
tractual and confidential relations with respect to industrial trade
secrets, as the Supreme Court recently affirmed in an opinion by
the Chief Justice which relied heavily on Goldstein."4 Important
complications aside, is there not a rough parallel here between
trade secrets and the copyright scheme that leaves unpublished
80 Id. at 570.
81 See Goldstein, "Inconsistent Premises" and the "Acceptable Middle
Grounds": A Comment on Goldstein v. California, 21 BULL. COPYR. Soc'Y 25
(1973).
82 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
83 So I thought in contributing to the Columbia Law Review's Symposium
in 1964. Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1216
(1964). I still think so; but perhaps I have insufficiently absorbed some astonish-
ingly loose and sweeping statements in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470 (1974). I have to leave these to articles I hope others are preparing; and
like Justice Marshall, concur only in the predictable outcome of Kewanee. See
Stern, A Reexamination of Preemption of State Trade Secret Law After Kewanee,
42 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 927 (1974), which came to hand just as this paper was
completed and which does not seem seriously inhibited by the author's position
in the Antitrust Division.
84 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). Justices Doug-
las and Brennan dissented.
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writings to state law? A trade secret is "unpublished," and is ef-
fectively exploitable only until it is disclosed or rediscovered.
Furthermore, an inventor is barred from a patent if his invention
has been in public use or on sale more than a year.85
There is a fascinating interplay between patents and copy-
right that keeps the differences just noted from becoming real dis-
tinctions; it is an interplay which turns on policies about preemp-
tion and publication.
DISTORTIONS OF "PUBLICATION"
Although the dissenting Justices in Goldstein tried to reha-
bilitate Sears-Compco preemption, they dealt no more adequately
than the Court did with the significance of publication, which sur-
vives only in mutilated form. Not that it was a polished and sym-
metrical touchstone before Goldstein. It has never been deci-
sively settled, for example, whether phonograph records published
the musical composition, as distinct from the rendition of the com-
position. The English-speaking visitor from outer space would
surely think that a hit song which had been broadcast wearisome
tens of millions of times and of which a million records had been
distributed, was "published;" and a number of judges from inner
space thought so too-albeit in obiter dicta." But there was an
intensely practical reason for the trade and the copyright bar to
resist such a conclusion. The Copyright Office would not accept
records for registration of copyright. The acquisition of section
10 copyright, to be sure, depends not on registration but on publi-
cation with notice; but where and how the notice should be affixed
was unknown. Furthermore, when dozens of recording com-
panies could use the compulsory license to produce their version
of a major hit, there would be understandable uncertainty about
the retention of the notice and about the consequence of its wide-
spread omission. 7 In any case, obtaining statutory copyright for
a song is simplicity itself. Even if old-fashioned sheet music is
no longer published for sale, the statute, as we have seen, offers
section 12 copyright by deposit of a single copy.
This ready availability of statutory copyright for musical
compositions set them apart from renditions, for which there was
no statutory copyright until the 1971 amendments. Its drafters
realized that only the sound recording could embody the rendi-
tion, a view consistent with the Hand position that only a recording
85 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
86 See KAPLAN & BROWN, supra note 4, at pt. 1, Topic B, § 4, at 79 et seq.
87 See Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phono-
graph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (1955).
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could publish the rendition, if it were to be "published" at all in
such a way as to divest common law rights.
The contrary notion is a stubborn one. Performance does
not publish a work even when the work is designed for perform-
ance and is commercially exploited chiefly by performance. In
American law the notion is rooted in Ferris v. Frohman,s8 which
involved the unauthorized production of a play of British origin
(with attendant complications that we may disregard). Justice
Hughes, in his magisterial manner that brooked no impediments,
held for a unanimous Court: "The public representation of a
dramatic composition, not printed and published, does not deprive
the owner of his common-law right, save by operation of stat-
ute."'8' And "[t]here was no statute here by virtue of which the
common-law right was lost through the performance of the un-
published play." 90  The defendant's production in Ferris took
place in 1905. The 1909 revision introduced section 12 with its
invitation to acquire statutory copyright without publication for
dramas as well as for music. Was the invitation one that had to
be accepted?
The suggestion that section 12 had some preemptive effect
has never taken hold,9 with the result that music, dramas, lec-
tures, motion pictures, works of art, and probably the whole world
of broadcasting (a technology barely nascent in 1909) can all be
exploited without resort to statutory copyright. Or they can make
use of section 12 so long as copies are not reproduced for sale.
Finally, if printed or pictorial copies are published, they can have
regular section 10 copyright. But if the entrepreneurs and au-
thors in these fields choose to stay with their common law rights,
they escape the limits on duration and any other constraints of
the statute. The price is that they must refrain from making and
selling copies of the work.
All this amounts to a serious distortion of the concept of pub-
lication, or rather of unpublication. Stemming from the classic
instances of the unpublished book manuscript in the desk drawer,
or the play existing only in working script, common law rights in
"unpublished" works have come to flourish wholly outside the con-
straints of the copyright statute.92  Does this distortion excuse the
88 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
89 Id. at 435.
90 Id. at 434.
91 See Selvin, Should Performance Dedicate?, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 40 (1954).
92 Apparently there has been considerable traffic in songs whose composers
do not seek either section 10 or section 12 copyright, exploit the songs on records,
and then claim to be immune from the statutory compulsory license. This claim
was neatly undercut by Judge Gurfein in Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp.,
354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Also, controversy and uncertainty persist
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introduction of still another incongruity, the state law copyright
in sound recordings?
For one thing, we should note that the new right makes it
possible for the producers of performances addressed to the ear
to retain all their existing rights, free of durational or other limits,
and then to do what most other common law copyright holders
could not do--exploit the work in copies for sale, still free of
statutory limits.
To be sure, the gravity of the anomaly is lessened by the fact
that it applies only to pre-1972 renditions. But these are not a
small array, even though they will diminish with time. The radio
stations that create the current Top Forty also plug golden oldies
that antedate their current audience of teenagers. Middle-of-the-
road stations keep older performances alive, so that markets re-
main evergreen, from Benny Goodman to the Beatles.
I have dwelt so much on the distortion of publication that
I have perhaps obscured my thesis that it is (or was) central in
the statutory copyright scheme. Let me baldly restate several
propositions:
1. Sears and Compco ascribed sweeping preemptive effect
to both the patent and the copyright statutes.
2. But the copyright statute leaves a block of power to the
states, namely over unpublished works.
3. Congress can bring unpublished works into the statute,
and has done so in section 12, but not preemptively.
4. Published works normally find protection, if any, under
the statute.
5. Whether a work is published or unpublished must be a
federal question, because publication is the primary signal for pre-
emption.
6. Some classes of works are not included in the statutory
scheme. If published, they are presumptively open to competi-
tive copying.
7. Congress may, however, authorize the states to regulate
published works, and conceivably did so in the disclaimer to the
1971 amendments with respect to preexisting sound recordings.
These were all respectable assertions until the Court in Gold-
stein reversed the presumption of preemption, gave publication
ignominious burial in a footnote, and consequently cast into doubt
propositions 1, 4, 5, and 6.
about what constitutes publication of motion picture sound tracks. See Yuzek,
Publication and Protection: In Qualified Support of the Copyright Office Ap-
proach to Motion Picture Soundtracks, 22 BULL. COPYR. Soc'Y 19 (1974).
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THE 1971 DISCLAIMER AND PREEMPTION
Can we learn anything from further exploration of the 1971
disclaimer? What might Congress have intended when it de-
clared that the new copyright in sound recordings was not to be
"applied retroactively or be construed as affecting in any way any
rights with respect to sound recordings" fixed before February 15,
1972?"3  The language is pretty colorless. One thing is clear.
Congress did not create any rights in existing recordings. Why
not? There are several possibilities, all speculative. First, those
who thought about the matter may have been daunted by the
practical problems with respect to recordings that were already in
circulation, of bringing them into a scheme that made vesting of
copyright depend upon notice and registration. But these prob-
lems would not have been insuperable. Those wishing to claim
copyright in pre-1972 recordings could have been given a reason-
able period of time to register their claims. Prospective copiers
of recordings already in circulation could then look to the Register
to discover whether the recording had gone into copyright.
Second, an informed legislator might also have thought that
pre-1972 recordings were in the public domain and that it was
simply not a good idea to try to bring them into copyright. The
belief that they were in the public domain would have derived
from an understanding that they had been divestitively published
by their general dissemination. This, as we have seen, had been
a controverted issue with respect to both the music and the rendi-
tions.
Third, if the informed legislator thought that pre-1972 re-
cordings were published and in the public domain, he might also
have thought that he was powerless to bring them back into copy-
right. There are strong statements to this effect in a patent con-
text, most recently and notably by the Chief Justice in a trade
secrets case: "That which is in the public domain cannot be re-
moved therefrom by action of the States. 94  But could removal
be brought about by action of Congress, so long as it stays within
the limited-time frame that would apply to other contemporary
works? 95
Fourth, the informed legislator might well have decided to
ignore these riddles and to leave the matter to state law, which
would in the end leave it to the courts to say how far states could
93 Nimmer has an interpretation that the disclaimer positively remits pre-
1972 sound recordings to the states. See, 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 35.225 (1974) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER]; cf. Kurlantzick, supra note 35,
at 244.
94 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
95 Cf. I NiMMm, supra note 93, at § 5.1 (1972), § 9.231 (1974).
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protect old sound recordings. What the expectations of a legisla-
tor taking this course might have been are also speculative. His
attention could have been called to the handful of state anti-piracy
statutes then in being. 96 These statutes, and another handful of
state equity actions decided without benefit of a statute,97 pointed
toward a misappropriation rationale for protecting sound record-
ings. Standing against them was the massive presence of Sears
and Compco. If the legislator was concerned about controlling
the reach of state power, especially its expression in the broad
terms of section 653h of the California' Penal Code, he did not
say so. Did he expect the state courts to limit or preclude state
power? Was he content to permit them to adjudicate without re-
gard to federal standards of divestitive publication? To recognize
rights not limited in time?
The alert legislator would have found that the state courts
that had responded to the outcries against record and tape piracy
had cast their responses in terms of the tort of misappropriation.
This was thought to be a way to circumvent the mandate of Sears
and Compco that state law could not forbid the copying of articles
unprotected by patent or copyright. The tape-pirate, New York
courts were able to discover, was not simply copying another's
product. He was misappropriating the "actual performances,"9' 8
the very essence of the recording artist's talent. The distinction
is fallacious. One could say with equal assurance that if Sears
made a mold from Stiffel's pole lamp and reproduced it they were
taking Stiffel's creation-"The product itself." 9  So they were-
but Stiffel still had it too; that-is what is distinctive about copying
in contrast to other forms of appropriation or misappropriation 00
96 Eight as of Sept. 22, 1971. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1971). Ten more by Nov. 1, 1973. See 21 BULL. COPYR. SOC'Y 194 (1973).
97 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798
(2d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970); Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970); Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
98 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 881,
252 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
99 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 538, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 798, 806 (2d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
100 Note, The "Copying-Misappropriation" Distinction: A False Step in
the Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-Emption Doctrine, 71 COLUM. L.
REv. 1444 (1971); 1 NIMMER, supra note 93, at § 35.224 (1974). The pole
lamp analogy-does it make any difference whether Sears "imitated" it or
physically copied it?-is in International Tape Mfg. Ass'n. v. Gerstein, 344
F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1972), vacated for unripeness, 494 F.2d 25 (5th Cir.
1974); see Kurlantzick, supra note 35, at 215, confuted in Comment, Goldstein
v. California: Breaking Up Federal Copyright Preemption, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 960, 975 (1974), which points out that the pirate's cost advantage would
decrease if he had to "imitate" by assembling musicians, etc. Usually no one
would want such an imitation anyway.
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-e.g., taxation or mugging-which leave the victim empty-
handed.
One form of unfair competition, fraudulent labelling, is not
privileged copying. So Sears and Compco affirmed. But, in
the absence of patent or copyright, they emphatically affirmed that
simple copying was privileged. For the state courts once again
to relabel copying as misappropriation was effective (one would
have supposed) only until the Supreme Court got wind of it.
The anti-piracy statutes also had to avoid Sears and Compco,
though they did not, like the courts, have to talk about how they
were doing it. With New York again providing the model, they
were directed in an elaborately offhand way at what was described
as a form of larceny, or "traffic in illicit and contraband property,"
as the Tennessee brief put it.101 The Attorney-General of the
state of New York declared that the prototype statute, General
Business Law section 561 ,1°2 was "an anti-larceny statute, whose
enactment was within the state's police power."'' "It has been
drawn," he said, "to prevent the theft of a particular type of prop-
erty."'0°4  Briefs addressed to the Supreme Court in Goldstein
made a great deal of this view that such statutes were exercises
of the police power. Drawing on that vast armory of state au-
thority helped fend off the threat of federal preemption.
Furthermore, what the New York statute penalized was the
"transfer" without the consent of the owner of sounds recorded
on a phonograph record. Thus the statute and its carbon copies
artlessly tried to avoid any suggestion that the copying of another's
work was prohibited'05 (although "unauthorized copying of phono-
graph records" did creep in as the caption of New York General
Business Law section 561).
It would have been a direct repudiation of Sears and Compco
for the Supreme Court to have accepted all this rigmarole. What
the Court did instead was, in one respect, commendable. Instead
of embracing the view that there was nothing forbidden here but
a little larceny, the Court firmly characterized the conduct of tape
pirates as a form of copying-and then declared that California
had, without knowing it, enacted a valid state copyright law.
101 Brief for the Attorney-General of the State of Tennessee as Amicus
Curiae at 1, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
102 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 561 (McKinney 1968).
104 Brief for the Attorney-General of the State of New York as Amicus
Curiae at 2, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
104 Id. at 6.
105 When a statute made it a misdemeanor to reproduce or duplicate for sale
certain state land maps not copyrighted, the Maryland court held that this was
an attempted prohibition of copying, impermissible under Sears-Compco. State's
Attorney v. Sekular, 249 Md. 499, 240 A.2d 608 (1968).
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THE NEW STATE COPYRIGHT
So instead of a shapeless tort (or crime) of misappropriation,
we have the new recognition of 'a state copyright power that may
extend to any kind of work that is not explicitly preempted. The
possibilities have naturally excited those who want protection for
particular works heretofore unprotected and have astonished
others who have canvassed the variety of interests now potentially
sheltered. Kaul set down and briefly commented on a shopping
list which he described as "by no means exhaustive" and which
included performers' rights (against imitation of a recognizable
style), clothing designs, nondramatic choreographic works, printed
forms, titles, moral rights, business systems, computer programs,
discoveries of laws of nature (these spilling over into patent
law), and "various aesthetic works."'106 He did not mention
a prime example of an interest important in movies and broad-
casting-characters, abstracted from the story-episodes in which
they appear. The copyright protection of characters has been
under a cloud ever since the Maltese Falcon case'0 7 (the charac-
ter is Sam Spade, not the falcon); and commentators looking
for sunshine think it may be found in Goldstein.'08
It would take another article to wade through the status of
all these interests and to try to predict whether they would be con-
sidered free of preemption. One would want to sort out old chest-
nuts like printed forms (claims for protection of forms are often
disguises for unprotectable machines or business ideas)'01 from
recent arrivals such as computer programs, where the desire is to
prevent use of one's program; copying is probably protected any-
how. 110 The idea that freedom from preemption could extend to
106 Kaul, And Now, State Protection of Intellectual Property?, 60 A.B.A.J.
198 (1974).
107 Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 216
F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954); see KAPLAN & BROWN, supra note 4, at 308-12.
108 Brylawski, Protection of Characters-Sam Spade Revisited, 22 BULL.
CoPYR. Soc'y 77, 91 (1974); Rothenberg, Some New Problems in Motion Pic-
ture Copyright Law, 21 BULL. CoPYR. Soc'y 214 (1974). One may be permitted
to doubt whether a character is an unpreempted category, or rather a subset
within books, dramas, and motion pictures, all very much preempted.
Goldstein was invoked in the magistrate's findings on remand from Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967). This was the
unique case of the amateur "character" who was the prototype for Paladin on
television. The magistrate found that DeCosta had a common law entertain-
ment service mark, and alternatively, that Goldstein validated his claims under
New York misappropriation law (Quaere?). See KAPLAN & BROWN, supra note
4, at 668. In DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 326
(D.R.I. 1974), the magistrate's report was adopted and held to be an appealable
judgment.
109 KAPLAN & BROWN, supra note 4, at 220, 225.
110 Id. at 228.
1044 [Vol. 22: 1022
HeinOnline -- 22 UCLA L. Rev. 1044 1974-1975
ADDISON MUELLER FESTSCHRIFT
new exclusive rights in already protectable categories-as in the
computer program example-seems especially wishful, but it is
seriously propounded."'
It is also possible that another historic dividing-line in copy-
right is threatened, namely the separation between "ideas," which
cannot be monopolized, and their "expression"-which is essen-
tially the sphere of copyright. The notion that the states might
be free to permit monopolies in ideas that have been published
-thus breaking down two great barriers at once-boggles the
conventional mind; and indeed the Court in Goldstein was careful
to shy away from any such heresy." 2
That some enthusiasts find such possibilities in Goldstein is
a reflection, if not of some special interest, then of an attitude
that deprecates any omission from protection. We see here an-
other round in a perennial conflict. On the one side is what Paul
Goldstein aptly calls "the competitive mandate""" imbedded in
the antitrust laws, in many applications of the commerce power,
and in the "limited Times" restriction of the copyright clause. On
the other side are the main thrust of the clause itself (in its choice
of "exclusive Right" as the means for encouraging "Science and
useful Arts"), most manifestations of misappropriation theories,
and deference to state economic regulation which inclines toward
anti-competitive measures.
Sears and Compco were bold and perhaps blunt expressions
of the competitive mandate. Goldstein is not avowedly anti-
competitive. It does help put down cheap tapes, but, as Justice
Marshall allowed in dissent, they are not a very appealing form
of competition anyway."' Its failure, from the standpoint of one
with a preference for less rather than more monopoly, lies in
weakening the preemptive force of the present statute and in de-
bilitating the potency of publication.
Publication was more than an historical boundary between
11 See Comment, Goldstein v. California: Breaking Up Federal Copyright
Preemption, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 960, 978 (1974).
112 412 U.S. at 570-71.
113 Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF.
L. REv. 873 (1971). In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, Justice Harlan dealt subtly with
state and federal powers in the course of disposing of the last vestiges of patent
licensee estoppel. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
114 412 U.S. at 579. In one view, piracy is competitive. It certainly
brings prices down. Conventionally, however, it is assumed that it will make
original recordings unprofitable, and that this burden will fall most heavily on
small companies (of which there are many) in an industry which is nevertheless
fairly concentrated (see 1970 Census data in 58 MINN. L. REV. 316, 323 (1973)).
Cf. 4 largest companies controlled 62 percent of the market; 8 largest controlled
73 percent. Disinterested views are rare. See, Hearings, supra note 2, at 20-22
(testimony of Barbara A. Ringer, now Register of Copyrights).
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common law and statutory copyright. In an imperfect way it re-
flected two fundamental things about intellectual and artistic prop-
erties. First, that in publication (i.e., communication) lies their
social meaning and worth. The unperformed score means very
little even to the composer-indeed more frustration than fulfill-
ment. Second, as property to be exploited for reward-not
simply consumed in use-intellectual and artistic productions
need uncommonly elaborate protection. One does not secure
rights in writings and discoveries by a padlock; one needs the legal
apparatus of copyright and patent law which we rather take for
granted.
Holmes did not. Reluctantly concurring in White-Smith v.
Apollo115 (he thought some protection for mechanical reproduc-
tions of music should be worked out), he observed:
The notion of property starts, I suppose, from con-
firmed possession of a tangible object and consists in the right
to exclude others from interference with the more or less free
doing with it as one wills. But in copyright property has
reached a more abstract expression. The right to exclude is
not directed to an object in possession or owned, but is in
vacuo, so to speak. It restrains the spontaneity of men where
but for it there would be nothing of any kind to hinder their
doing as they saw fit. It is a prohibition of conduct remote
from the persons or tangibles of the party having the right.
It may be infringed a thousand miles from the owner and
without his ever becoming aware of the wrong. It is a right
which could not be recognized or endured for more than a
limited time, and therefore, I may remark in passing, it is one
which hardly can be conceived except as a product of stat-
ute, as the authorities now agree. 116
What then is to be done? Probably the time has come to
bury publication, not to praise it. If it has been crippled so that
it cannot patrol the boundaries of state and federal interests, and
if unpredictable canons of preemption are to take its place, prob-
ably the best solution is a unitary system-one in which all ex-
ploitable works will be gathered into one national system.
THE GENERAL REVISION TO THE RESCUE
I am now of course describing the General Revision of the
Copyright Law, a majestic and lumbering enterprise that calls for
initial capitals because it has been under way since 1955. A bill
was introduced in 1965 and passed the House in 1967.117 In
115 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
116 Id. at 19.
117 For developments to 1968 see Nimmer, Foreword: Two Copyright
Crises, Project-New Technology and the Law of Copyright: Reprography and
Computers, 15 UCLA L. REV. 931 (1968).
HeinOnline -- 22 UCLA L. Rev. 1046 1974-1975
ADDISON MUELLER FESTSCHRIFT
1974, not much changed, it had a spurt of animation and passed
the Senate."' Perhaps, after twenty years, 1975 will be its year.
Inaction-stalemate-has resulted from the slow struggles of
interest groups and fluid coalitions of interest groups: authors
against publishers; authors and publishers against photocopying
schools and libraries; composers against their publishers; com-
posers and publishers against broadcasters; composers and broad-
casters against cable television; composers against record com-
panies; performers against composers and record companies; com-
posers and performers and record companies against pirates;
everybody against juke-box operators clinging to a 1909 exemp-
tion;'19 movie producers against almost everybody; computer pro-
gram designers against program users; industrial designers against
retailers. The catalog is long and tiresome. The issues are some-
times principled, but usually they boil down to Samuel Gompers'
principle: More.
Amidst all this clash of arms one authentic principle has
remained constant since 1965: The revision introduces a unitary
system in which:
Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device.' 20
A definition of "fixed" emphasizes that any embodiment that is
of "more than transitory duration" will do, and that a fixation
simultaneous with a transmission (e.g., a broadcast) is effec-
tive. 12 1  Under the revision, then, the availability of copyright is
automatic once the work is on a manuscript, a tape, a film, or
whatever. It is perfected when the work is published by the tradi-
tional copyright notice and by deposit in the Library of Congress;
but these requirements are accompanied by generous allowance
for mistake and delay. 122  For present purposes, the innovation
118 Sept. 9, by a vote of 70-1, 120 CONO. REc. 16167 (1974). See gen-
erally Derenberg, U.S. Senate Passes Omnibus Revision Bill (S. 1361) and Interim
Legislation (S. 3976), 22 BuLL. CoPYR. Soc'Y 1 (1974). When S. 1361 came to
the floor it included in section 114, in addition to the right against duplication
of sound recordings that we have been discussing, a new right in the public per-
formance of sound recordings, with a compulsory license scheme. S. 1361, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 114(b) & (c) (1974). This is the performance right in a rendi-
tion that was claimed in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940). However, this new performers' right was
knocked out by a vote of 67-8. Derenberg, supra at 2.
119 17 U.S.C. § I(e) (1970) (last sentence).
120 S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a) (1975).
121 Id. § 101. Other definitions are in other sections.
122 id. §§ 401-07.
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is the existence of federal copyright from their creation for all pro-
tected works save performances and like activities that can exist
without fixation; and these also are easily protectable by fixation
on tape or film.
However, that is not all. Section 301 is headed "Pre-emp-
tion with respect to other laws." It is so directly responsive to
almost every issue raised in this paper that it must be set forth
(and read) in full:
(a) On and after January 1, 1975, all rights in the na-
ture of copyright in works that come within the subject matter
of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether
created before or after that date and whether published or un-
published, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter,
no person is entitled to copyright, literary property rights, or
any equivalent legal or equitable right in any such work under
the common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with
respect to:
(1) unpublished material that does not come within
the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in any
tangible medium of expression;
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings
commenced before January 1, 1975;
(3) activities violating rights that are not equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106, including breaches of
contract, breaches of trust, invasion of privacy, defama-
tion, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off and
false representation. 123
"The subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103" is, in section 102, a simpler version of what is section
5 in the present Copyright Act:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings.124
Section 103 deals with "compilations and derivative works."
To see what is not preempted we look to section 301(b)(1),
a pale shadow of present section 2.121 The first thing to be said
123 Id. § 301.
124 Id. § 102(a).
125 Quoted in full at text accompanying note 37 supra.
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is that (b)(1) makes more sense if "including" is read to mean
"and." Difficulties arise in trying to fit the "including" part
within the "unpublished material" part; and an authoritative Com-
mittee Report makes it fairly clear that this is not the intention. 12 6
The "including" clause leaves to state law all unfixed works.
These can only be sight and sound events that are not already
fixed in a text or a score, and could include the content of impro-
vised music or drama, extemporaneous speeches, many "panto-
mimes and choreographic works," sporting events, and the sounds,
i.e., the renditions, that when fixed become "sound recordings."
But note that when any of these is fixed (that is, taped or filmed)
state rights end. One can foresee intriguing problems of proof
when an author wants to be either in or out of state copyright
protection. Was the work really fixed? Where is the tape? Can
it be unfixed, by destroying a unique tape? For now, I emphasize
only the ease of fixation and therefore of getting federal copy-
right.
The first part of (b)(1) is more interesting. What kinds
of material do not come within the section 102 subject matter?
The House Committee Report of 1967, still a basic guide to inter-
pretation, observed that there are "areas of existing subject matter
that this bill does not propose to protect,"' 27 and appended this
footnote:
Without implying that they would be wholly without
protection under one or another of the seven categories listed
in sec. 102, or that they are necessarily the 'writings' of au-
thors in the constitutional sense, we cite the following as ex-
amples. These are areas of subject matter now on the fringes
of literary property but not intended, solely as such, to come
within the scope of the bill: typography; unfixed perform-
ances or broadcast emissions; blank forms and calculating de-
vices; titles, slogans, and similar expressions; certain
three-dimensional industrial designs; interior decoration;
ideas, plans, methods, systems, mathematical principles; for-
mats and synopses of television series and the like; color
schemes; news and factual information considered apart from
its compilation or expression. Many of these kinds of works
can be clothed in or combined with copyrightable subject
matter and thus achieve a degree of protection under the bill,
but any protection for them as separate copyrightable works
is not here intended and will require action by a future Con-
gress. 1 28
This declaration lends force to the obvious implication of (b)(1):
126 H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1967). The important
analysis of section 301, id. at 96-100, appears to be reproduced substantially
verbatim in S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 163-67 (1974), accompanying
S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
127 H.R. REP. No. 83, supra note 126, at 14-15.
128 Id. at 15 n.I.
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If unpublished material not within section 102 is left to the states,
published material in these categories is preempted. It is, for the
present, left unprotected either by state law or by the statute. We
are part way back from Goldstein to Sears.
Let us now look at (b)(3). It recites a familiar list of torts
and other state rights of action which have long co-existed (and
now and then conflicted) with federal copyright. These are left
to the states under the general classification of "activities violating
rights" so long as the rights are not "equivalent to " those granted
to copyright holders in section 106 (and then qualified and some-
times taken away in sections 107-17). These basic rights are
those of reproduction, distribution, public performance, public
display, and making derivative works. The state must keep hands
off any activity that is seen to violate a copyright kind of right,
e.g., the right to reproduce copies. It would no longer be possible
to invoke state notions of "deceptive trade practices" or "unfair
competition" to restrict what the federal courts would describe as
a form of copying. I am of course harking back to the Court's
approach to the "activities" in Goldstein. As the Court correctly
observed, what the defendants were doing was copying. It is sig-
nificant that (b)(3) uses the phrase "deceptive trade practices,"
and not the looser "unfair competition." With its tolerance of
state authority in (b) (3) essentially limited to passing off and false
representation cases, a stern banishment of the misappropriation
tort is evident, 129 and we are nearly all the way back to Sears.
There is one final observation to make about section 301(a),
which is generally sweeping, positive, and not in need of exegesis.
Note that it covers works "created before or after" its effective
date, and thus wipes out the weak disclaimer that caused all the
trouble in Goldstein.
The House Committee Report called section 301, which
represents a major centralization of control, "one of the bedrock
provisions of the bill."' 80  After the uncertainties created by
Goldstein, it is more bedrock than ever and a powerful argument
for getting on with the revision. That effort is sound in its core
provisions, though seriously flawed where it has been pulled out
of shape, mostly by protectionist demands.' Yet for all its flaws,
129 "[Wjhere the cause of action involves the form of 'unfair competition'
commonly referred to as 'misappropriation,' which is nothing more than copy-
right protection under another name, section 301 is intended to have preemptive
effect." H.R. REP. No. 83, supra note 126, at 100; S. REP. No. 983, supra note
126, at 167.
180 H.R. Rm,. No. 83, supra note 126, at 96; S. REP. No. 983, supra note
126, at 163.
131 "Protectionist" can refer to demands of either producers or users of
copyrighted material. As examples only of the former, I would cite the com-
1050 [Vol. 22: 1022
HeinOnline -- 22 UCLA L. Rev. 1050 1974-1975
1975] ADDISON MUELLER FESTSCHRIFT 1051
it is a national statement of rights and interests that really have
little to do with state lines. When we are told that "New York"
or "California" has this or that public policy, it is more realistic
to guess that interests without enough influence to move Congress
have managed at least to have their way with local lawmakers.
ONCE PUBLISHED . . .
A last elegiac word about publication. I spoke earlier of
burying it, since it had been caused to fail as a divider between
local personal interests on the one hand, and national expressive
policy on the other. In the general revision it is not so much
buried as retired. It turns up here and there, with a useful set
of errands to run: When is notice to be affixed? When may a
state regulate unprotected kinds of works? And it has a statutory
definition, so that, anchored in the bedrock of section 301, what
is publication is now surely and securely a federal question.
Learned Hand's ghost can rest in peace.
Publication in these modest roles will faintly recall an era
when it was the event that signalled the emergence of a writing
from the quiescent cocoon of an unpublished manuscript to the
free flight of a published book, watched over by a protective copy-
right code. This was an era when Lord Brougham, reaffirming
in the great case of Jefferys v. Boosey3 2 that protection of a pub-
lished work could be found only in the statutes, could exclaim
"Volat irrevocabile verbum, whether borne on the wings of the
wind or the press,"1 1 3 in the confident assumption that his noble
and learned friends would not need to be reminded that the first
words of Horace's line were: "Semel emissum"--once published
-"Once published a word takes flight and cannot be recalled."'3 4
bination of prolonged duration (life plus 50 years) with a right of reversion to
the author after 35 years (S. 22 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 302, 303 (1975)), and
the limited privilege of non-profit performance of musical works (id. § 110).
Of the latter, I would cite the awkward resolution of the juke box exemption
(id. § 116). As for cable television uses (id. § 111), one can only say a
plague on both your houses.
132 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854).
133 Id. at 740; ee KAPLAN & BROWN, supra note 4, at 53, 805.
1.44 HORACE, EpisL s 1:18:71.
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